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Abstract
The Co Processing Intrusion Detection System (CuPIDS) project explores improving information system security
through dedicating computational resources to system security tasks in a shared resource, multi processor (MP) architec 
ture. Our research explores ways in which this architecture oﬀers improvements over the traditional uni processor (UP)
model of security. One approach we examined has a protected application running on one processor in a symmetric
multi processing (SMP) system while a shadow process speciﬁc to that application runs on a diﬀerent processor. The
shadow process monitors the application process  activity, ready to respond immediately if the application violates policy.
Experiments with a prototype CuPIDS system demonstrate the feasibility of this approach in the context of a self protect 
ing and self healing system. An untuned prototype supporting ﬁne grained protection of the real world application WU 
FTP resulted in less than a 15% slowdown while demonstrating CuPIDS  ability to quickly detect illegitimate behavior,
raise an alarm, automatically repair the damage done by the fault or attack, allow the application to resume execution,
and export a signature for the activity leading up to the error.
  2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This paper describes research into the Co Pro 
cessing Intrusion Detection System (CuPIDS)—an
exploration into increasing information system
security by dedicating computational resources to
system security tasks in a shared resource, multi 
processor (MP) architecture. We demonstrate that
this architecture allows the use of higher ﬁdelity
monitoring models, particularly with regard to
the timeliness of detection, but also in terms of
ﬁner grained visibility into the execution of a pro 
tected application than is reasonably feasible using
current monitoring paradigms (e.g., internal func 
tion call pattern monitoring versus system call pat 
tern monitoring). The resultant decrease in
detection time coupled with highly focused security
policy compliance monitoring enables quicker
response to erroneous activity then was previously
possible. We demonstrate responses that prevent
further damage to a compromised system as well
as responses focused on self healing—returning a
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www.elsevier.com/locate/comnetcompromised system to a secure state automati 
cally and before the compromise is able to eﬀect
system operation.
Our philosophical foundations are fourfold: high
assurance is important, a great deal of information
about how systems are supposed to operate is often
available but rarely used, MP computer systems are
becoming commonplace, and ﬁnally that informa 
tion systems will be vulnerable to attack or errone 
ous behavior for the foreseeable future. A body of
research into co processing techniques for tasks
such as secure booting and digital rights manage 
ment exists, much of which centers around the use
of specialized hardware such as cryptographic
co processors [1,2]. More recent work has investi 
gated possible security enhanced, multi core chip
architectures [3]. However, not nearly as much work
has been done in investigating how generalized secu 
rity tasks can beneﬁt from dedicated co processing.
Most past and present Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) architectures assume a uni processor environ 
ment, or do not explicitly make use of multiple pro 
cessors when they exist. The advent of multicore
processors from the mainstream processor manufac 
turers such as Sun, Intel and AMD will result in MP
systems becoming more common outside the server
farm. We believe this aﬀords us novel opportunities
to be creative with how system resources are allo 
cated. In addition to the use of dedicated co pro 
cessing, our research diﬀers from existing work in
our use of highly focused monitoring techniques.
We are concerned with a very general threat
model that assumes:
• Processes running at any privilege level in the
production parts of the system may be compro 
mised at any time after boot is complete.
• Attacks or faults may be caused by the activities
of local or external users or a combination of
both.
• Attacks or faults may result in a system compro 
mise without ever causing a context switching
event.
We believe that under some circumstances
CuPIDS can be more eﬀective than Standard Uni 
processor based Intrusion Detection/Intrusion Pre 
vention Systems (StUPIDS).
1
For our purposes more eﬀective is shown by dem 
onstrating that:
1. Running concurrently with attack code aﬀords
CuPIDS opportunities to detect and respond to
attacks that are not available to StUPIDS.
2. Because the opportunity exists to detect attacks
while they occur without waiting for a context 
switching event (either between user processes
or between user and kernel mode) CuPIDS may
be able to respond more quickly and attacks
may be detected with higher ﬁdelity.
These are advantages that are diﬃcult or impos 
sible to achieve on a uni processor system—no mat 
ter how powerful.
2. Background
This section describes the time and intrusion
detection domain with which we are concerned
and brieﬂy references related research.
2.1. Time domain
Because some of the primary gains we anticipate
from CuPIDS are time related, we need to clarify
what time domain we are working in. To do so
we draw from a recent categorization of computer
security systems. Kuperman s Ph.D. dissertation
[5] describes four major timeliness categories in
which detection can be accomplished: real time,
near real time, periodic and retrospective. It is in
the categories of real time and near real time that
CuPIDS oﬀers signiﬁcant gains over StUPIDS.
To specify what we mean by real time and near
real time we borrow Kuperman s notation. We rep 
resent the set of events taking place in a computer
system by the set E. This set contains suspect events
B such that B   E and there exist events a, b,a n dc
such that a, b, c 2 E and b 2 B The notation tx rep 
resents the time of occurrence of event x. Finally, we
need a detection function D(x) that determines the
truth of the statement x 2 B.
Real-time: Detection of a bad event b takes place
while the system is operating and is further
restricted to mean that detection of b occurs
before an event, c, dependant upon b takes place.
Given E, real time detection requires the ordering
tb < tD b  < tc
1 The name StUPIDS is in tribute to the work done in Purdue s
Coast Laboratory on the IDIOT intrusion detection system [4].
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occurs within some, typically small, ﬁnite time d
after the occurrence of b. This requires the
ordering
jtb   tD b j 6 d
While no complete detection function D(x) exists,
there are a great number of bad events, BD ={ b0,
b1,...,bn} 2 B for which we do have eﬀective detec 
tion functions. Assuming the existence of identical
CuPIDS and StUPIDS detection functions, DCuPIDS
(BD) and DStUPIDS (BD) CuPIDS oﬀers improve 
ments in guaranteed detection time. On a uni pro 
cessor system in which the StUPIDS runs as a
normal task the soonest it can possibly detect a
bad event, bi, is when a context switching event
occurs after tbi but before tci and the scheduler
chooses the StUPIDS to run. In the best case bi
involves the execution of a system call or some other
blocking event, the scheduler picks the appropriate
StUPIDS process to run next, and bi is detected
before ci can occur. In the worst case the system is
compromised before the StUPIDS has an opportu 
nity to run and detect bi.
Other complications include the relative priority
of StUPIDS processes to other processes in the sys 
tem, and even if a StUPIDS process is chosen to
run, its portion of DStUPIDS (BD) may not include
bi. Therefore even though the StUPIDS is capable
of detecting bi it may not do so before the produc 
tion process is made active again and tci occurs. This
means that even though DStUPIDS(bi) exists a
StUPIDS can at best claim near realtime detection
with d = CPUQuantum, where CPUQuantum repre 
sents the average amount of time each process is
allocated by the system scheduler. In the case of a
StUPIDS running on a MP machine, the appropri 
ate monitoring process may be executing at the right
time; however, there is no guarantee that this is the
case. CuPIDS reduces the uncertainties described
above by ensuring, whenever possible, the appropri 
ate monitor is executing, thus oﬀering real time
detection capability.
2.2. Detection domain
Among the factors that make intrusion detection
in generalized computing environments diﬃcult is
the wide range of capabilities that must be pro 
tected. By forcing the security system designer to
cover a wider range of resources, the defensive
assets are, in a sense,   stretched thinner   than they
will be in the highly focused CuPIDS environment.
CuPIDS  ability to concentrate the right defenses at
the right time on critical tasks coupled with the abil 
ity to use well deﬁned security boundaries as deﬁned
by the program designer and system security policy
allows the exploration of highly eﬀective intrusion
detection functions. These beneﬁts are not without
cost, however. The combination of parallel based
monitoring and tightly focused detectors is primar 
ily eﬀective when the detection algorithm can keep
up with the monitored process. In the notation from
Section 2.1, CuPIDS  beneﬁts reside mostly in the
domain where tD(b) is small enough that tD(b) < tc
can be guaranteed. This means CuPIDS  detectors
are mostly limited to O(1) algorithms with small
constants. This restriction is signiﬁcant; however,
there exist many attacks or errors which can be
detected by short, fast algorithms—data structure
invariant violations such as buﬀer overﬂows or call
stack violations are two examples. Furthermore,
even in the cases where real time detection is not
possible, CuPIDS can claim improvements in near
real time detection times over traditional architec 
tures. These improvements stem from CuPIDS
application of the appropriate monitoring function
at the appropriate points in monitored application
execution.
While our research is generally applicable to any
computing environment in which multiple proces 
sors are available, we anticipate that it will be most
useful in the dedicated server environment. Ideally,
these machines are not used for general purpose
computing and run only a streamlined set of appli 
cations dedicated to the service the system provides.
These simpliﬁed conﬁgurations are not only simpler
to maintain, but their smaller attack surfaces [6] are
simpler to defend as well.
2.3. Prior research
There exists an enormous body of work on tech 
niques for detecting and preventing violations of
security policy. Axelsson s in depth taxonomy and
survey of the ﬁeld of intrusion detection in 2000 is
a good starting point for those unfamiliar with the
ﬁeld [7]. We draw from those techniques and aug 
ment them in ways that make use of the MP para 
digm. Many of the speciﬁc intrusion detection
techniques a CuPIDS will use diﬀer from their
StUPIDS counterparts only in the real time, simul 
taneous monitoring nature of their use. Of particu 
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time error checking from runtime execution, those
modeling the state of the production process exter 
nally, and those making use of coprocessors or vir 
tual machine architectures in performing
monitoring tasks. This section presents only a sam 
pling of the relevant literature given in [8].
2.3.1. Debugging
An example from the separate runtime error
checking body of research is that done by Patil
and Fischer [9] on detecting runtime errors in array
and pointer accesses. They point out that including
runtime error checking may slow applications by as
much as a factor of 10, which is an enormous price
to pay given that most runs of a well tested program
are error free. Therefore once debugging and testing
is complete, runtime error checks are disabled
before the code is placed into production use. While
this makes sense from a performance perspective, it
is dangerous because errors that may have been
caught by those runtime checks go undetected,
potentially causing severe damage. The authors
responded by creating guard programs that model
the execution of the production program, but only
at the pointer and array access level. The guards
include all runtime checks on pointer and array
bounds and were capable of detecting many runtime
errors that evaded the software testers during devel 
opment. These guards were run as batch processes
using trace information stored by the production
process. The paper also discussed having the guard
run on a separate processor or as a normal process,
interleaving execution with the production process.
The runtime penalty perceived by the user was typ 
ically less than 10%. We use the idea of exporting
runtime checks to a shadow process; however, our
work diﬀers from theirs in that we focus on real 
time monitoring of the actual memory locations in
use by the production process as well as a much lar 
ger set of monitoring capabilities.
2.3.2. External modeling
Research into performing intrusion detection via
external modeling of application behavior such as
the work done by Haizhi Xu et al. [10] in using con 
text sensitive monitoring of process control ﬂows to
detect errors is a good example of external model 
ing. They deﬁne a series of   waypoints   as points
along a normal ﬂow of execution that a process
must take. They focused their eﬀorts on the system
call interface and demonstrated good results in
detecting attempts to access system resources by a
subverted process. CuPIDS makes use of a similar
idea to their waypoints in its checkpoints, those
points in both the interactive and passive systems
where CuPIDS is notiﬁed of events in which it is
interested; however, CuPIDS checkpoints are much
ﬁner grained and are generated within the produc 
tion process as well as its interaction with the exter 
nal environment. As an example, CuPIDS uses
function call entry and exit information to perform
rough granularity program counter tracking and
validation as well as model a program stack for
use in detecting illegitimate control ﬂows within a
process code segment.
Related work by Feng et al. [11] describes novel
work in extracting return addresses from the call
stack and using abstract execution path checking
between pairs of points to detect attacks. Finally,
Gopalakrishna et al. [12] present good results in per 
forming online ﬂow  and context sensitive modeling
of program behavior. Gopalakrishna s Inlined
Automaton Model (IAM) addresses ineﬃciencies
in earlier context sensitive models [13,14] by using
inlined function call nodes to dramatically reduce
the non determinism in their model while applying
compaction techniques to reduce the model s
memory usage. Using an event stream generated
by library call interpositioning, IAM is shown
to be eﬃcient and scalable even in a StUPIDS
architecture. The techniques used by IAM ﬁt
naturally into the CuPIDS architecture. The model
simulation can be run as a shadow process in
CuPIDS, getting its inputs from the CuPIDS event
streams.
2.3.3. Virtualization and co-processors
ID has been performed using both machine virtu 
alization and the use of dedicated co processors
[1,2,15–18]. An example of the latter category
includes the work done by Zhang et al. [16] in
describing how a crypto co processor is used to per 
form some host based intrusion detection tasks. In
their research they examine the possible eﬀectiveness
of using hardware designed for securely booting the
system to run an intrusion detection system. The
beneﬁts from doing so include protecting the IDS
processor from the production processor, and oﬀ 
loading IDS work from the main processor onto
one dedicated for that task. Strengths of this
approach include high attack resistance for code
running in the co processor system. Drawbacks of
the approach include the lack of ready visibility into
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system.
These strengths and drawbacks also exist in the
use of virtual machine architectures. Garﬁnkel and
Rosenblum discuss a novel approach to protecting
IDS components [18]. They pull the IDS out of
the host and place it in the virtual machine monitor
(VMM) with the primary goal of enhancing attack
resistance. This approach has the beneﬁt of largely
isolating the IDS from code running in the virtual
host. The VMM approach has much in common
with the reference monitor work discussed by
Anderson [19] and Lipton [20] in that it provides a
means by which the IDS can mediate access between
software running in the virtual host and the hard 
ware. It can also interpose at the architecture inter 
face, which yields a better view into system
operation by providing visibility into both software
and hardware events. A traditional software only
IDS does not have this advantage. Of course, the
IDS running in the VMM has visibility only of the
hardware level state. This means that the IDS can
see physical pages and hardware registers, but must
be able to determine what meaning the host O/S is
placing on those hardware items. By running as part
of the host O/S, CuPIDS maintains complete visibil 
ity of the software state of the entire system, but
currently lacks the protection aﬀorded to VMs
and secure co processor architectures. Future work
on CuPIDS will use hardware protection mecha 
nisms such as those in the Intel IA32 [21] processor
line to provide protection of security speciﬁc
components as well as critical operating system
components.
3. CuPIDS architecture
The CuPIDS architecture is fully described in [8],
and is summarized here.
User Mode Process Memory
Production
CPU
Shadow
CPU
Production
Process
Memory
Control Stream
Event Stream
Kernel
Process
Shadow
Fig. 1. High level overview of the CuPIDS architecture.
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The basis of the CuPIDS architecture is parallel
monitoring of the activities of a process by another
process as the ﬁrst process executes. Fig. 1
graphically depicts a high level overview of the
architecture. CuPIDS is designed around a shared 
resource, symmetrical multi processing (SMP)
hardware foundation. As seen in the ﬁgure, pro 
grams using the architecture are divided into two
components, the protected application and a shad 
owing application. The CuPIDS architecture is
event driven. As the protected process executes it
generates a stream of events based upon its activi 
ties. These events are used by the shadowing process
to choose speciﬁc monitoring actions. The overlap 
ping use of memory depicted in the ﬁgure is used
to illustrate that nearly all the protected process
state is available to the shadow process (only the
internal state of the CPP s CPU is currently not vis 
ible to the CSP). This enables non intrusive security
monitoring while the protected process executes.
Finally, the shadowing process is able to control
the activities of the monitored application. This
control capability allows CuPIDS to protect the
process and system when illegitimate behavior is
detected by preventing the illegitimate execution of
a compromised process (e.g., halting a process in
which a buﬀer overﬂow has occurred before any
injected code can be executed).
CuPIDS operates using the facilities and capabil 
ities aﬀorded by a general purpose symmetrical
multi processing (SMP) computer architecture.
Common operating systems such as Windows,
Linux, and FreeBSD running on SMP architectures
use the CPUs symmetrically, attempting to allocate
tasks equally across the CPUs based upon system
load [22]. CuPIDS diﬀers from these architectures
in that at any point in time one or more of the CPUs
in a system are used exclusively for security related
tasks. This asymmetrical use of processors in a
SMP architecture is a signiﬁcant departure from
normal computing models, and represents a shift
in priority from performance, where as many CPU
cycles as possible are used for production tasks, to
security where a signiﬁcant portion of the CPU
cycles available in a system are dedicated solely to
protective work. One possible CuPIDS software
architecture is depicted in Fig. 2. The dark compo 
nents represent production tasks and services and
run on one CPU while the light components repre 
sent the CuPIDS monitors and run on a separate
CPU. The regions of overlap depict CuPIDS ability
to monitor the resource usage of production
components.
The operating system as well as user processes
are divided into components that are intended to
run on separate CPUs. The intent behind this sepa 
ration is twofold: performance, where we seek to
minimize the runtime penalty imposed by the secu 
rity system, and protection, where we are concerned
with the completeness of detection. By ensuring the
processes responsible for detecting bad events are
actively monitoring the system during periods in
Scheduler
Other O/S Services
Support
Production
CuPIDS CuPIDS
Thread
Production
Production Production
Process/
Process Process
Process Process
CuPIDS System Call Wrapper
Scheduler
Process/
Thread
Support
Virtual
Memory
Virtual
Memory
System Call API
Fig. 2. Basic software architecture.
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ture requires that when a CPP is executing its
associated CSP is also on a CPU—we provide a
real time detection capability (using Kuperman s
notation as deﬁned in Section 2.1). The system pro 
tection derives in part from the ability to detect bad
events as they occur but before the results of these
events can cause a system compromise.
A program intended to operate in CuPIDS is
divided into two components, a CuPIDS monitored
production process (CPP) and a shadowing
CuPIDS process (CSP) as depicted in Fig. 3.
As the ﬁgure shows, CuPIDS processes diﬀer
from the traditional process paradigm in the asym 
metric sharing of memory between the CSP and
CPP. The CPP is a normal process and contains
the code and data structures that are used to accom 
plish the tasks for which the program is designed. It
may also contain code and data structures with
which information about the state of the running
process is communicated to the security component.
In addition to the normal process code and data
structures, the CSP s virtual memory is modiﬁed
to contain portions of the CPP s virtual memory
space (depicted in the ﬁgure as Shadow Memory).
This allows the CSP to directly monitor the activi 
ties of the production component as it executes.
Our initial work assumes the CPP developer is
aware of CuPIDS and the CPP communicates its
state to the CSP by sending a stream of messages
about events of interest to CuPIDS. Later work will
investigate what types of real time monitoring are
possible for uninstrumented applications.
3.2. Protective activities
The CuPIDS architecture currently supports
three types of protective activities: Applica 
tion startup/shutdown validation, state moni 
toring, including invariant testing, and execution
monitoring.
Application startup/shutdown: Startup tasks
include verifying the authenticity of both the
CSP and CPP as well as any supporting conﬁgu 
ration ﬁles. The CSP is loaded and started exe 
cuting. It then loads the CPP into memory,
establishes any needed hooks into the CPP s
VM space, initializes the various event communi 
cation systems, and ﬁnally starts the CPP run 
ning. Shutdown tasks include verifying that the
CPP shutdown path followed a legitimate code
path. Additionally, any runtime history data is
saved to disk.
Fig. 3. CSP and CPP details.
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ing appropriate hooks into the kernel, CSP is
able to monitor nearly all aspects of the CPP s
operating environment and state. This includes
the CPP s entire VM space and any related kernel
data structures and excluding only the internal
processor state while the CPP is on a CPU.
One use of this capability is invariant testing.
Invariant testing is a two stage process involving
pre compilation work and runtime invariant
checking. The pre compilation task involves
determining which variables need monitoring,
deﬁning invariants for those variables and
exporting that information in a form that can
be used by the CSP. The compiler is also used
to automatically instrument the CPP by adding
event generation hooks into each function pro 
logue and epilogue. Invariants are currently snip 
pets of code that could be directly included in the
CPP s code (similar to the run time debugging
tests discussed earlier). They are compiled into
the CSP s code, and when one is used, it is given
appropriate pointers to the CPP s virtual mem 
ory space and executed. Currently these are man 
ually written; however, work is underway to
allow a programmer to indicate, to the compiler
via pragmas, that a particular variable needs
protection and the compiler will automatically
generate the invariant testing code in the CSP.
Runtime execution monitoring: Runtime monitor 
ing includes a number of activities and capabili 
ties that give the CSP visibility into the
operation of the CPP. An example includes gen 
erating events so the CSP is made aware of the
creation, accesses to, and deletion of a protected
variable s lifespan. Other events export an execu 
tion trace to CuPIDS via function call monitor 
ing, and interactions between the CPP and
external environmental entities such as calls to
runtime libraries and the operating system. Call
monitoring consists of the CPP sending a stream
of function/library/system call entry and exit
events to the CSP. The CSP then uses a model
based upon how the CPP is supposed to operate
to verify if that stream is legitimate.
In addition to the direct monitoring of the CPP
performed by the CSP, CuPIDS has a number of
background capabilities that augment the CSP s
capabilities. These include the ability to intercept
and direct low level system activities such as inter 
rupts and signals, controlling the system scheduler
to enforce the segregation of the CuPIDS and sys 
tem CPUs and ensuring that whenever a CPP is
chosen to run, its associated CSP is also placed on
the CuPIDS  CPU. Additionally, CuPIDS provides
a streamlined, interrupt based communication
interface for moving event records from the CPP
to the CSP running on a diﬀerent CPU.
3.3. Self-healing/self-protection
There are a number of well known to be danger 
ous library functions (such as those associated with
string handling) and syscalls (such as those associ 
ated with invoking a system shell) [23]. Among the
most common exploits publicly available are buﬀer
overﬂows that use unsafe string handling library
functions to overﬂow vulnerable buﬀers. Using a
combination of stack modeling, library call event
monitoring and virtual memory mapping capability
it is possible for CuPIDS to automatically detect
and generate detection signatures for certain com 
mon classes of vulnerabilities such as stack based
overﬂows. In many cases buﬀer overﬂows use
known library function such as strcopy(3). When
CuPIDS is notiﬁed of a call to strcopy it can create
a copy on write (COW) mapping of the page(s) con 
taining the buﬀer and surrounding memory region.
If information about buﬀer sizes is available to the
CSP, either automatically generated or inserted by
the programmer in the form of CuPIDS memory
operation events, it becomes possible for CuPIDS
to not only detect and generate signatures for anom 
alous events, but also to recover from them auto 
matically. It does so by using the saved copy of
stack (or heap) pages to recreate the process  mem 
ory state as it was before the overﬂow, and copying
only the correct amount of data into the buﬀer from
the corrupted pages. While in the case of an exploit
attempt, the data ending up in the buﬀer may not be
what the CPP programmer intended, the overall
eﬀect to the program is the same as if a safe string
copy function such as strncopy(3) had been used.
In addition, error variables or signals may be set
to indicate that something unexpected occurred.
Many of the shadowing ideas CuPIDS uses can
be implemented without requiring the use of
multi processing. CuPIDS makes use of the data
available to the shadow in a parallel environment
to repair corrupted data structures without having
to pause the CPP; however, these capabilities can
also be eﬀectively used in a non CuPIDS architec 
ture if detection is timely enough and the monitored
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which interposes itself in the system call interface—
a commonly used monitoring paradigm [24,25].
Upon an invocation of a dangerous system call
the monitor could make a memory snapshot before
passing the call to the operating system. If the call
damages the data structure in use, the interposing
IDS can use the snapshot to repair the damage in
a manner akin to CuPIDS. The beneﬁts oﬀered by
CuPIDS in this domain are the inverse of the inter 
posing system call IDS  weaknesses. Wagner and
Soto [26] discusses ways in which the pattern match 
ing behavior of many system call interpositioning
IDS can be evaded by mimicking legitimate patterns
of system calls. CuPIDS  low level visibility of the
state of the CPP negates this type of attack by
ensuring not only legitimacy of system call patterns
for a particular CPP, but also by ensuring the call
originated from a valid location in the CPP s
address space and that the execution sequence prior
to the call was correct. Garﬁnkel [27] discusses how
diﬃcult it is to get the monitoring interface right
across the entire range of possible system call usage
by user applications. CuPIDS  tight coupling of
monitor with application, at the individual function
call level allows, in many cases, precise validation of
inputs too, and expected outputs from dangerous
system calls. This precision can reduce or eliminate
the need for expensive general case anomaly detec 
tion algorithms. Finally, [28] highlights the (often
prohibitively expensive) runtime cost overhead
incurred in passing control to the monitors as well
as the general case anomaly detection which must
be done every time the monitor is invoked. CuPIDS 
ability to model the behavior of an interposing IDS
without the context switching overhead is a signiﬁ 
cant improvement.
4. Implementation
We have implemented a prototype CuPIDS. This
section brieﬂy describes the current state of that
prototype. For a more in depth discussion of the
implementation see [8]. Our experimentation uses
FreeBSD, currently 5.3 RELEASE [29].W eh a v e
added to the operating system API a set of CuPIDS
speciﬁc system calls that give CuPIDS processes vis 
ibility into and control over the execution of a CPP.
Examples of the new functionality include the abil 
ity to map an arbitrary portion of the CPP s address
space into the address space of a CSP, a means by
which signals destined for—and some interrupts
caused by—the CPP are routed to the monitoring
CSP, etc. The operating system kernel has been
modiﬁed to perform the simultaneous task switch 
ing of CPPs and CSPs, a CSP protected loading
capability as discussed above in Section 3.2, and
hooks into various kernel data structures have been
added to allow the CSP better visibility into CPP
operation and for runtime history data gathering.
Our experimentation to date has focused on
protecting speciﬁc applications.
2 We perform inter 
active monitoring based upon automatically gener 
ated instrumentation from the compiler as well as
CPP programmer deﬁned invariants for key vari 
ables. CuPIDS has the capability to automatically
examine program binaries and extract explicit
white lists about which system resources are used
by the CPP, and then save this information in a
form usable by the CSP. As the CPP executes, the
CuPIDS instrumentation compiled into it sends
messages to the CSP notifying it about program 
mer deﬁned operational activities such as protected
variable lifetime events (creation, accesses and dele 
tion). The automatically generated control ﬂow
events (currently all function call entry and exits,
to include library and syscall invocations) are
passed to the CSP as well. In the case of execution
ﬂow events such as function or system calls, the
event generation mechanism makes use of low level
system primitives
3 to include in the event a non user
spoofable source and return address for the ﬂow
changing call. The CSP receives these messages
and uses them to ensure the CPP is operating cor 
rectly. In the case of variables the CSP performs
pre  and post condition invariant checking, and in
the case of ﬂow control, it veriﬁes that all function
calls are to and from legitimate locations within
the CPP text segment. It also maintains a model
of the CPP call stack and veriﬁes all function returns
are to the correct locations, etc.
5. Results
Upon completing the initial CuPIDS implemen 
tation, a series of tests were performed to explore
its behavior. The experiments as described in [8]
and summarized here were designed to determine
2 The techniques involved are largely applicable to operating
system protection as well.
3 The last three branch records stack available in Intel IA32
processors as described in Section 15.5 of [30].
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totype, supported or refuted our research hypothe 
sis. The prototype allowed us to verify basic
CuPIDS functionality. The system is able to cor 
rectly load and execute CPP and CSP components,
and the CSP is able to detect invariant and security
policy violations as well as illegitimate control ﬂow
changes. Upon detecting a fault or attack, the CSP
is able to halt the CPP, raise an alarm and save the
state of the CPP s memory and execution trace his 
tory. In some cases automatic repair is possible. An
example of such a case is where real time detection
has occurred (e.g., tD(b) < tc, where b is the corrup 
tion of the stack by a buﬀer overﬂow and c is the
execution of that injected code), and suﬃcient infor 
mation exists that repair of corrupted process state
is possible (e.g., CuPIDS made a memory snapshot
of the stack region immediately prior to the over 
ﬂow). In these cases CuPIDS can repair the damage
from the attack or error. This repair may necessitate
pausing the errant process, but our experimentation
demonstrated that in some simple cases such as
stack repair, CuPIDS was able to repair the cor 
rupted CPP stack before the return into the injected
code occurred, thus allowing the CPP to continue
execution without interference. Additionally, the
experiments demonstrate it is possible for one pro 
cess to eﬃciently perform realtime runtime error
checking on variables in another process as well as
perform simple ﬂow control validation. To demon 
strate the validity of our research hypothesis we
demonstrate that CuPIDS can provide guaranteed
detection of certain attacks before a context switch 
ing event occurs. This claim cannot be matched by a
StUPIDS, even one equipped with a comparable
detector set.
5.1. Test design and methodology
In our experimentation we used a combination of
widely used, open source applications and servers as
well as applications created speciﬁcally to test cer 
tain aspects of CuPIDS  functionality. The com 
monly used applications were WU FTP version
2.6.2 and gnats version 3.113.12. These programs
were chosen because they represent server class soft 
ware typical of that used in our target environment
(an organization s public facing demilitarized zone);
their source code is available so that we could exam 
ine and instrument them; and because they contain
exploitable vulnerabilities as demonstrated by pub 
licly available exploits.
5.1.1. Test platform
The experiments described below were run on a
SMP platform with dual Xeon 2.2GHz processors,
1G RAM and a single 120GB ATA100 drive.
Hyperthreading (HTT) was enabled so the operating
system had 4 CPUs available. CuPIDS only con 
trolled the scheduling of tasks on CPU1; the system
scheduler was responsible for scheduling CPU0,
CPU2 and CPU3. In a representative example exper 
iment involving CuPIDS, the CSP was the only user
of CPU1, the instrumented ftpd daemon used all of
CPU0 s cycles, the ftp client used all of CPU2 s
cycles, and the operating system, including the test
drivers, ran mostly on CPU3. The test drivers ensure
that all ﬁle I/O is done on local drives so that net 
work overhead does not become a factor. We
observed that the loading on the operating system
CPU (CPU3 in the above example) was typically
low, on the order of 5–10%, and that releasing
CPU1 from CuPIDS control did not signiﬁcantly
impact system performance (CPU1 and CPU3
would both be mostly idle while CPU0 and CPU2
were saturated by the demands of fptd and the test
client, respectively). During the non instrumented
experiments CPU1 is held idle to provide ftpd the
same operating environment as it had in the instru 
mented runs. ftpd was run as root in standalone
mode (command line ftpd -s which causes it to
stay in the foreground and fork processes as needed).
5.2. Runtime eﬃciency tests using WU-FTP
The initial experiments connect to the ftp
daemon (the CPP), log in, change local and remote
directories, and perform a series of 300 ftp ﬁle trans 
fers and one ls (directory listing) for a total of 301
transfers. The intent of this workload was to stress
ftpd, both internally and externally through ﬁle
I/O system calls for long enough that meaningful
time measurements could be made. The ﬁle transfer
workload is 1,881,832,400 bytes and the overall
workload per experiment is 1,881,904,317 bytes.
Three sets of 50 experimental runs were made, one
using the CuPIDS interrupt based IPC, one using
SysV IPC, and one baseline test was run against a
non instrumented version of WU FTP. The results
are summarized in Table 1.
The initial tests are intended to measure the over 
head involved in getting CuPIDS events out of the
CPP and into the CSP, therefore we constructed
a worst case event load based on program ﬂow
control monitoring. In the instrumented tests, all
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includes internal functions, libc and intra libc calls
as well as system calls. Each event includes caller
address and callee address information. These
events are validated against a whitelist of calls stat 
ically extracted from the ftpd binary. The initial
whitelist contained all the legitimate non function 
pointer based function and shared library calls as
well as a list of all function pointer uses. An initial
experimental run identical to the timing runs was
made to train the CSP on the actual function poin 
ter usage. The CSP received each function/library/
system call event, veriﬁed it against the whitelist,
and used it to model the CSP s program stack.
The timing related tests did not include embedded
invariant tests.
Each experimental run took between two and
four minutes and generated approximately 1.4 mil 
lion events corresponding to WU FTP s activities.
As shown in Table 1 the overhead of generating
and using those events was around 15% for the
CuPIDS IPC as opposed to approximately 100%
for the SysV based IPC. Note that this overhead
should be balanced against the removal of an inline
IDS doing the same tasks. Even a standalone IDS
with a similar detector set would be competing for
CPU cycles with the CPP, likely degrading applica 
tion performance.
5.3. Control ﬂow change results
A number of experiments were run to validate
CuPIDS  ability to detect illegitimate control ﬂows
in the CPP.
1. Illegitimate system call invocation detection: Both
gnats and WU FTP were used in these tests. In
both applications a buﬀer was overﬂowed in such
a way that bytecode contained in the overﬂow
string was executed. The injected code made a
number of system calls from the stack. CuPIDS
was able to detect all of the illegitimate system
call invocations.
2. Illegitimate internal function call invocation detec-
tion: Both gnats and WU FTP were used in these
tests. In both applications CuPIDS was able to
detect an internal function call that had been
removed from the whitelist (simulating the activ 
ity of injected code that makes calls to function 
ality embedded in the vulnerable application).
CuPIDS was also able to detect calls to functions
that bypassed the prologue event generator. It
did so by detecting illegitimate program stack
activity in the stack model.
3. Illegitimate library call invocation detection: Both
gnats and WU FTP were used in these tests. In
both applications CuPIDS was able to catch a
call to a library function that was removed from
the whitelist.
4. Spooﬁng/masquerading detection: CuPIDS de 
tected attempts to make library or system calls
from locations other than those speciﬁed in the
whitelists. This prevents attackers from perform 
ing masquerading attacks such as those described
in [31]. The CuPIDS IPC mechanism guards
against spoofed event generation by including
in each event the return address for the generat 
ing function as taken from the stack. As the
address is placed on the stack by the processor
Table 1
WU FTP runtime performance measurements (50 samples)
Event comm. method Clock time (s) User time (s) Sys. time (s) Throughput (MB/s)
Interrupt based mean 139.42 0.44 1.27 14.53
stdev 1.43 0.05 0.09 0.17
stderr 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.02
min 133.55 0.34 1.08 13.87
max 141.44 0.53 1.42 14.99
SysV IPC based mean 166.67 0.41 1.62 15.61
stdev 0.37 0.05 0.07 0.30
stderr 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.04
min 166.04 0.28 1.51 15.32
max 168.12 0.52 1.84 16.08
Non instrumented mean 117.74 0.41 1.34 15.94
stdev 0.24 0.04 0.08 0.07
stderr 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
min 117.47 0.29 1.16 15.76
max 119.13 0.50 1.53 16.04
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no way for a user program to spoof this
information.
5. Direct variable protection: WU FTP was used for
these experiments, which involved performing
invariant testing on simple variables (int, char,
simple structs) and a string buﬀer. As discussed
earlier, CuPIDS was able to detect illegitimate
changes to both classes of variables. In the case
of a stack based buﬀer overﬂow it was able to
detect the overﬂow, save the overﬂowing data,
repair the corruption to memory following the
buﬀer, terminate the string in the buﬀer appropri 
ately (by writing a zero into the end of the buﬀer),
allow the CPP to continue running, and write the
overﬂow string and information about the over 
ﬂow out to disk. In these experiments the detec 
tion took place as the overﬂow occurred, so
CuPIDS was able to halt the CPP before it could
return to the corrupted instruction pointer on the
stack. Therefore the attack was stopped before
any control ﬂow change took place—a capability
unique to a parallel monitoring architecture such
as CuPIDS. Even had the buﬀer overﬂow not
been directly detected, CuPIDS would have
detected the control ﬂow change to the stack
and might have been able to make the same
repair.
5.4. Time to detect
We ran a number of experiments to determine
how quickly CuPIDS detected illegitimate events.
Two types of tests were run: one that performed
an invariant test upon notiﬁcation that a variable
access was complete, and one in which real time
monitoring was used. Measuring the detect times
for these tests without a hardware based in circuit
emulator (ICE) proved challenging. Our theory
stated that CuPIDS  ability to perform simulta 
neous monitoring of memory shared using the vir 
tual memory mapping capability would result in
detection at the point the invariant was violated.
4
Using the O/S clocks to mark violation and detec 
tion times was not feasible because of the over 
whelmingly large overhead imposed by system
calls. To quantify how quickly the CSP detects a
problem we instrumented the CPP by adding a
counter that starts incrementing immediately fol 
lowing the completion of a monitored variable
access. When the CSP detects a violation it imme 
diately takes a snapshot of this counter. A buﬀer
overﬂow in WU FTP was used as the invariant
violation. Each set of tests was run in both
CuPIDS multi processor (MP) mode and StUPIDS
uni processor (UP) mode, and the postcondition
invariant tests were also run in blocking mode,
where the CPP waited until the CSP signaled it
was done with the invariant test, and non blocking
mode where the CPP notiﬁed the CSP that it was
done with the variable modiﬁcation and continued
execution without waiting. 40 experiments were
run for each of these eight conﬁgurations. The
results of these experiments, summarized in Table
2 are as follows:
1. Simultaneous monitoring: In these tests a moni 
toring task is started upon notiﬁcation that a
protected variable is to be accessed. In the
CuPIDS case this monitor is placed on the
CuPIDS CPU and runs parallel with the CPP.
In the StUPIDS case the monitor is scheduled
as is any other task and its execution is inter 
leaved with the execution of the CPP. The aver 
age of 8.2 million instructions executed by the
UP CPP before overﬂow detection takes place
compared to the immediate detection of the over 
ﬂow in the CuPIDS CPP, validates our research
theory—that architectures such as CuPIDS can
detect illegitimate events faster than can UP
architectures.
2. Blocking invariant checking: In these tests,
the CPP sends a blocking checkpoint event to
the CSP immediately following the variable
access. Because the CPP is not allowed to con 
tinue execution until the invariant test is com 
plete, it is not surprising that both MP and
UP mechanisms immediately caught the
overﬂow.
3. Non-blocking invariant checking: In these tests,
the CPP sends a non blocking checkpoint event
to the CSP immediately following the variable
access and continues execution. The consistent
results from the CuPIDS CSP are expected, and
reﬂect the amount of time it takes to perform
the invariant test. The much higher and inconsis 
tent results from the UP CSP reﬂect the sched 
uler based non determinism faced by all
StUPIDS architectures.
4 Actually, at the point the cache snooping mechanism detected
the shared usage of the memory location and propagated the
change from the CPP s CPU into main memory and the CSP s
CPU s cache.
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6.1. Desired supportive capabilities
While the results presented above show promise,
we believe that a paradigm shift towards multi pro 
cessor security may lead to changes in the basic plat 
form upon which architectures such as CuPIDS are
built. Some areas we anticipate exploring include:
Compiler support: The compiler can automati 
cally generate events for variable lifecycle opera 
tions. As an example, as buﬀers are allocated and
used appropriate events can be generated and
dispatched. Another alternative is to allow the
programmer to direct the compiler to do this
work using a mechanism such as pragma, or
assertions.
Hardware support: Better support for moving
blocks of information between speciﬁc CPUs will
be useful. As an example, the shared registers on
the Xeon HTT processors provide a convenient
scratchpad for small amounts of information.
Additionally, better debugging capabilities can
be designed. A capability similar to the debug
registers but that can operate on shared memory,
and possibly on larger data areas would be use 
ful. The ability to set a memory write breakpoint
on a CSP CPU and have it detect writes to that
memory location by other CPUs would reduce
the number of messages needed to keep track of
CPP activity. It may be more practical to do this
type of operation on multicore processors.
Operating system support: More eﬃcient means
of IPC designed speciﬁcally around an asymmet 
rical MP design such as CuPIDS are possible.
CuPIDS  extensions to the FreeBSD API are a
start in this direction, and the extended inter pro 
cessor interrupt (IPI) message passing system
from the DragonFly BSD variant [32] would
probably be useful.
6.2. Self-protection
Mandatory access control (MAC) models such as
Biba s integrity based model [33], and Bell and LaP 
adula s multi level security[34] models might beused
toprovideaﬁrst linedefenseagainstuserapplication
compromise. While MAC protection systems are not
novel, the CuPIDS architecture uses hardware pro 
tection mechanisms in commodity CPUs to deﬁne
andprotecttheMACmechanismandCuPIDSthem 
selvesagainstdirectattacksthatattempttobypassits
controls. We are currently investigating the use of
hardware primitives such as Intel s virtualization
technology [35] to protect the portions of CuPIDS
which reside in the operating system from compro 
mises of kernel level processes.
7. Conclusion
For many information systems, high assurance,
in terms of keeping an application running in spite
of faults or attacks, is more important than raw per 
formance. This is particularly true for an organiza 
tion s mission critical applications and servers. We
believe and demonstrate that dedicating one or
more processors in a MP system speciﬁcally to secu 
rity tasks can increase system robustness in the face
of faults and attacks. We further believe oﬄoading
the security work from the production parts of the
system will allow the use of security techniques
which may be too computationally expensive when
performed inline.
Examples of such techniques include the runtime
debugging checks and assertions employed during
Table 2
Buﬀer overﬂow time to detect measurements (Pin means that the CSP was pinned to the CuPIDS CPU and synchronized with the CPP;
non pin means the CSP was scheduled like any other process. Blk indicates the detector function was run inline with CPP execution; non 
blk means the detector function was not inline.) (40 samples)
Monitor type (results based on 40 samples) Mean (# instr) Stdev (# instr) Max (# instr) Min (# instr)
MP, Pin, Parallel 0 0 0 0
MP, Pin, Blk, Postcond 0 0 0 0
MP, Non pin, Blk, Postcond 0 0 0 0
MP, Pin, Non blk, Postcond 32,142 15,000 73,134 5,481
MP, Non pin, Non blk, Postcond 258,207 547,000 2,478,906 18,081
UP, Blk, Postcond 0 0 0 0
UP, Non blk, Postcond 33,807,836 23,676,701 85,376,601 0
UP, Parallel 8,250,607 3,710,207 12,687,579 1,518,471
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these are commonly placed in vulnerable or critical
code during the debugging and testing phases of the
software lifecycle but are removed from shipping
code because of the runtime performance degrada 
tion they impose [9]. A great deal of speciﬁcally
focused information about how an application is
intended to behave is available to system architects
and developers; however, we do not believe this
wealth of information is commonly used in runtime
security monitoring of production systems. The
CuPIDS architecture is speciﬁcally designed to
make use of such information in a reasonably eﬃ 
cient manner.
While trading performance for security is not a
new idea, we believe our combination of dedicating
computational resources to running highly focused
monitoring functions in parallel with protected pro 
duction code is both novel and worthwhile. We
believe the CuPIDS architecture to be more eﬀective
than StUPIDS architectures in terms of real time
detection of bad events as well as oﬀering some
novel detection techniques based upon the low level
and parallel nature of the monitoring. By dedicating
computational resources explicitly to security tasks
we are trading performance for security; however,
by oﬄoading some security tasks from the produc 
tion process to the security process and running
them in parallel we are decreasing the workload of
the system production components. We have con 
structed a prototype of this architecture and used
it to verify CuPIDS basic functionality.
The CuPIDS architecture is novel in that we
explicitly divide the system into production and
security components, embed explicit knowledge of
how the production components are intended to
operate into specialized security monitors and
ensure the appropriate security component is run 
ning on a processor whenever a particular produc 
tion component is running on a diﬀerent processor.
The architecture allows ﬁne grained visibility into
the operation of a protected process. We intend the
CuPIDS architecture to be detection model agnos 
tic—capable of supporting many diﬀerent IDS.
The detection capability of CuPIDS is currently
all speciﬁcation or white list based. Therefore it
has a zero false positive error rate; thus the alarms
output from CuPIDS are suitable for use by auto 
mated response systems. In fact, much of CuPIDS
strength derives from its automated response capa 
bilities. Its tightly focused, parallel monitoring capa 
bility allows for rapid detection of and response to
illegitimate behavior. The combination of real time
detection (discussed in Section 2.1) allowed by par 
allel processing and an ability to automatically
repair some damage aﬀorded by CuPIDS  low level
interface into the host operating system let CuPIDS
not only stop the attacks, but help maintain opera 
tion of critical components of systems.
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